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ABSTRACT
Can process conditionality really enhance poverty reduction in developing countries?
This question is addressed in the framework of a politico-economic model considering
political distortions both on the recipient and on the donor side. It turns out that process
conditionality is a very useful tool to raise the welfare of the poor as long as the
international aid organizations hold all necessary information to assess the political
situation in recipient countries and to select the true representatives of the poor into a
participatory process. If they do not hold this information or if other bureaucratic
interests reduce their incentive to acquire this information, process conditionality loses
its effectiveness in achieving the desired objective.
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11. INTRODUCTION
There is now a wide-spread consensus that development aid is successful only under
certain circumstances, and that there is no general positive relation between aid and
growth (Boone 1996). This is acknowledged even in publications of the World Bank
(World Bank 1998). The question therefore arises how aid can be restructured in such
a way as to be more effective in promoting growth and reducing poverty. As the
international community has formally engaged itself to reduce poverty by half until
2015, the challenge to enhance aid effectiveness becomes even more pressing.
In order to meet this challenge, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have
recently shifted their focus towards increased ownership and broad based support for
policy measures in developing countries. In particular, there is a now a strong
emphasis on participatory processes, which have become a formal requirement for the
elaboration of developing countries poverty-reduction strategy papers (PRSP).
Some of the IFIs traditional conditionality was replaced by this new requirement,
notably in the context of the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) 
Initiative which established a new focus on processes. This shift in conditionality
requirements gave rise to a new term, the so-called process conditionality (Foster et
al. 1999).
If taken seriously as a requirement to reach a consensus among all relevant
stakeholders about a wide range of macroeconomic, social and institutional reforms,
this new conditionality is probably much more restrictive than traditional
conditionality ever was (Morrissey 2001). In any case, it is interesting to note that, by
emphasizing political decision making processes, the IFIs today formally recognize
the problems of the political economy within recipient countries. This also is a rather
recent development. Until the late 1980s, during the period of the cold war, such
problems may have been recognized, but were rarely pointed out directly by either the
IFIs or other donor organizations in order not to lose the political support of the
governments concerned at the international level (Alesina and Dollar 2000).
While emphasizing the political economy in recipient countries, it should be kept in
mind that IFIs themselves and the policies they propose are subject to policy interests
of the IFIs own bureaucracy, as well as of donor governments and international
NGOs (Vaubel 1991, Willett 2000, Easterly 2002). In order to fully understand the
problem of aid effectiveness, this dimension of the aid giving process has to be taken
into account as well.
The paper is influenced by the theoretical literature on the political economy of aid.
While this literature is rather rich as far as the effects of aid in the recipient country
are concerned, it is still rather limited as to the analysis of donor behavior.1 In this
field, the literature is predominantly empirical and oriented towards the general
explanation of the geographic distribution of aid (see Drazen 2000 for an overview).
Literature combining both aspects is even more limited. Martens et al. (2002) and
Azam and Laffont (2003) are first attempts to simultaneously consider incentive
problems in both recipient countries and donor agencies within a single theoretical
model.
                                                          
1 A recent exception is Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2000).
2In our paper, we explicitly focus on the interactions between the politico-economic
aspects of recipient and donor policies. It can be shown that taking into account only
the political economy of the recipient country may considerably bias the expected
results of aid policy. While conditionality can improve the situation of the poor in
developing countries if IFIs and donor governments are benevolent, this is no longer
ensured if either or both pursue self-interested policies. In particular, if they are
pressured by business interests or NGOs, it can also follow that the poor will actually
lose from external help and conditionality.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, the basic model will be presented, and
the effects of both traditional and process conditionality will be discussed. Section 3
introduces bureaucratic interest and public pressures. Section 4 concludes.
2. TRADITIONAL VERSUS PROCESS CONDITIONALITY
In a first step, we consider a benevolent IFI offering loans to enhance poverty
reduction in a developing country. We thereby suppose that the IFI maximizes
welfare in the world as a whole, i.e. in both donor and recipient countries.
The recipient government is non-benevolent and subject to influences from different
local interest groups, that are brought together in the governments political-support
function. For simplicity, we consider only two groups representing the poor and the
rich. The weight of each groups welfare within the governments utility function
depends on its political influence, which may reflect its proximity to government
officials, its capacity to influence public opinion, and / or its capacity to challenge the
prevailing power structure through economic, financial or military means. On this
basis, it appears plausible to suggest that, generally, the weight of the welfare of the
poor will be rather small (Boone 1996, Drazen 2000). Thus our discussion is more
applicable to cases where governments are influenced by powerful elites rather than
being elected by the poor.
We further assume that there is a single national policy instrument that can be used by
the government. This instrument can be defined as specific distortions from pro-poor
growth to the benefit of the rich, and to the detriment of the poor. Examples for this
are distortive taxation, tariffs and quotas, or inflation that benefit the rich and hurt the
poor. Our policy instrument can be understood as an index of such distortive policies
(Mayer and Mourmouras 2002). These distortions also reduce welfare in the donor
country since the latter enjoys some positive long-term effects from growth in the
recipient country. Taking donor interest into account and giving an equal weight to
the welfare of all people in the recipient country, the IFI will try to reduce distortions
by giving aid to the government. Traditionally, it does so by conditioning aid
disbursements on the governments policy performance.
2.1. The basic model
In order to present the above described situation in a formal model that facilitates
comparisons of different IFI and government policies, we draw on earlier work by
Mayer and Mourmouras (2002) as well as Boughton and Mourmouras (2002). Their
model is slightly adjusted in order to allow us to distinguish between the welfare of
the rich and the welfare of the poor within the governments utility function. Apart
from introducing two groups, we use a different political structure. While they use
Grossman and Helpmans (2001) political contributions model, we use a political-
3support function approach, because this better captures different types of political
influence that are not restricted to pecuniary influences.2
Let W denote welfare after IFI assistance has been disbursed and before any
repayment has been made. For all groups considered, W depends on the overall
amount of aid (T) and on policy distortions (ω). U denotes net welfare after all loans
have been reimbursed. The different political actors are denoted by superscripts (P:
the poor, R: the rich, G: the recipient government, D: the donor governments, and
I: the IFI). The parameter b indicates the rate of repayment of IFI loans. For grants, b
is equal to zero. The money for development aid is financed by the donor government
who hands it out to the IFI. The IFI decides about how much of the loan has to be paid
back. It is interested in receiving back at least part of it to be able to issue further
loans in the future. It is also conceivable that the amount of money that the donor is
willing to hand out depends on how much is being paid back. θ indicates the weight
of the poor in the utility function of the recipient government. If not otherwise
indicated, we assume θ < 0.5 reflecting the relatively low political influence of the
poor. The parameter γ denotes the weight the IFI attaches to the overall welfare of the
recipient country. Depending on the mission of the IFI the relative weight can be
higher or lower. It can also be imposed on the IFI by the donor government or by
public pressure such as from NGOs. All parameter values (b, q, θ and γ) are defined
to lie between zero and one.
Given these definitions, the utility functions of the five actors can be formulated as
follows:
(1)   ( ) 0 W          and        0 with W,                                   bTT,WU PTPPP ><−ω= ω
(2)   ( ) 0 W          and       0 with W,                                   bTT,WU RTRRR >>−ω= ω
(3) ( ) ( ) ( ) bTT, Wθ1T,W θU RPG −ω−+ω=
(4)       ( ) 0 W          and       0 with W,                                           T,WU PTDDD <<ω= ω
(5) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )bT 1T,WT,WT,W U DRPI γ−+ω+ω+ωγ=
Moreover, in order for a loan to be attractive to the recipient government, we can
formulate the condition:
(6) ( )  0b Wθ1 Wθ RTPT >−−+
Assuming that with raising ω and T, marginal welfare losses increase while marginal
welfare gains decrease, we define all second derivatives to have a negative sign. This
is equivalent to saying that for all political actors, welfare curves are strictly concave.
                                                          
2 For a taxonomy of different approaches to model political influence, see Drazen
(2000) or Rodrik (1995).
4With fully unconditional aid, the recipient government would simply maximize (3)
with respect to its policy index ω, where subscripts denote partial derivatives:
(7) ( ) 0 Wθ1 WθU RPG =−+= ωωω
This first order optimization condition allows us to compute the governments
reaction (RR) and policy adjustment with respect to changes in the amount of aid:
(8) ( )( ) RP
R
T
P
T
G
G
T
 Wθ1 Wθ
 Wθ1 Wθ
U
U
dT
d
ωωωω
ωω
ωω
ω
−+
−+
−=−=
ω
Since the denominator is unambiguously negative, the sign of this expression depends
on the cross-derivatives in the numerator. Mayer and Mourmouras (2002, p. 12)
suggest that the numerator is negative, so that, taking into account the negative sign in
front of the expression, dω/dT also becomes negative, implying that the slope of the
reaction function is negative, i.e. more aid induces the government to reduce
distortions. Taking into account, however, that the welfare of the poor and the rich
can be differently affected by a policy change, we come to a different result. While it
is indeed plausible to assume that for the poor, the negative impact of distortions
becomes even more strongly negative when aid is increased, i.e. that the negative
effect increases in absolute terms ( )0WPT <ω , it appears less plausible that the positive
effect of distortions on the welfare of the rich should decrease with increasing aid. In
fact, aid funds can be used to create additional rents from a given distortion ω (Boone
1996, Svensson 2000a). This leads us to assume 0WRT >ω .
3 In this case, (8) becomes
positive if the weight of the welfare of the rich in the governments utility function is
sufficiently high. This actually implies that aid becomes counterproductive and is to
the disadvantage of the poor.
The IFIs indifference curves are given by:
(9) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0dT b 1dTWdWdT WWd WWdU DTDRTPTRPI =γ−++ω++γ+ω+γ= ωωω
This directly allows us to calculate the slope:
                                                          
3 We can countercheck the plausibility of the assumptions on cross derivatives using
the equalities RT
R
T WW ωω =  and 
P
T
P
T WW ωω = . If 0WW
P
T
P
T <= ωω , this implies that the
marginal utility the poor can derive from additional aid decreases with the level of
distortions. This appears to be a plausible assumption. At the same time,
0WW RT
R
T <= ωω  would imply that the positive effect of aid for the rich decreases with
rising distortions. The plausibility of this assumption seems to be at least questionable
since distortions may be directly used for the appropriation of the additional funds in
form of rents. In this case, we should rather assume 0WW RT
R
T >= ωω . This is consistent
with our assumptions.
5(10) ( )( ) ( )b 1WWW
WWW
d
dT
D
T
R
T
P
T
DRP
γ−+++γ
++γ
−=
ω
ωωω
Given the above assumptions of concavity of the welfare functions, the numerator
turns positive for small ω, and the denominator turns negative for large T. We thus
obtain the IFIs indifference curves I0 and I1 as depicted in Figure 1. Given the
governments reaction function, the highest level of utility the IFI can reach is I0.
Assuming that the IFI has the necessary prior information about the governments
best response, the amount of development assistance offered will be T0. Accordingly,
the government chooses the optimal level of distortions at ω0. This Stackelberg
equilibrium is denoted by point B.
Figure 1: Aid and distortion without conditionality
I0
I1 B
A
RR
ω
T
T0
ω0
Note that as compared to a situation without aid (cf. point A), both the recipient
country government and the IFI are better off. However, due to the positive slope of
the governments reaction function assumed, the equilibrium with aid implies higher
distortions so that the welfare effect for the poor is not necessarily positive. It is not at
all clear that more aid will actually reach the poor. This result is consistent with the
empirical studies on aid effectiveness by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and World Bank
(1998). Aid is unambiguously positive only for the rich since they benefit from higher
distortions and from aid.
2.2. Traditional conditionality
Given the above results, it is not surprising that IFIs have sought means to condition
aid on good policies. Introducing conditionality, the benevolent IFI can improve its
own situation and simultaneously ensure that aid is beneficial for the poor. In terms of
our model, instead of proposing any fixed amount of aid, the IFI now provides aid
conditioned on the level of distortions. Taking into account the governments
participation constraint UG(ω,T) ≥ UG(ω,0), the IFI maximizes its own utility and
informs the recipient government about the shape of the resulting indifference curve I1
expressed as a reaction function T(ω). The recipient government now chooses the
6optimal distortion subject to I1. The equilibrium (T1, ω1) is given by the tangential
point of the two indifference curves I1 and G1. It is denoted as C in Figure 2.
Algebrarily, the indifference curves of the recipient government are given by:
(11) ( ) ( )( ) 0dT bdTWdWθ1dTWdWθdU RTRPTPG =−+ω−++ω= ωω
The corresponding slope is:
(12) ( )( )  b Wθ1 Wθ
 Wθ1 Wθ
d
dT
R
T
P
T
RP
−−+
−+
−=
ω
ωω
Given (6) the denominator is always positive. The sign of the numerator depends on
the relative size of PWω  and 
RWω . Given the concavity of both welfare functions, the
negative effect of distortions on the welfare of the poor will dominate the positive
effect on the rich for large ω. With the negative sign in front of the overall expression
we obtain the shape of the curves as depicted in Figure 2. Note that the governments
initial reaction function depicts the locus where dT/dω is just zero.
Setting (12) equal to (10) leads to the contract curve indicating all Pareto optimal
decision points. However, since we have assumed that the IFI alone retains all
bargaining power and predefines I1 as its reaction function, no rents accrue to the
recipient government and we obtain a single equilibrium at C.
Figure 2: Aid and distortion with traditional conditionality
I0
I1 B
A
RR
ω
T
CT1
T0
ω0ω1
G1
G0
Comparing the new equilibrium C to the situation without aid (A), by construction,
the recipient government remains at the same level of utility. However, the welfare of
the poor clearly rises since assistance is increased (from 0 to T1) while distortions are
reduced to ω1. The IFI also reaches a higher level of utility.
As compared to the situation with unconditional aid (B), we observe that both
distortions and aid are reduced. The latter, however, merely depends on the slope of
7the RR-curve. If the governments reaction curve is relatively flat, conditionality
increases rather than reduces the amount of assistance received. This can be explained
by the fact that a relatively flat positive slope is the result of a strongly positive impact
of aid on the rents of the rich from distortion. Since the IFI knows that much of its
assistance will be used unproductively to increase these rents, it is not willing to offer
much assistance in the first place. Once the government makes the commitment to
reduce unproductive rents through accepting IFI conditionality, the IFI is ready to
make higher investments.
If the amount of assistance increases, the poor clearly benefit from conditionality.
Otherwise, the negative effect of aid reductions may potentially outbalance the
positive effect of reduced distortions. However, as opposed to the case of
unconditional aid, conditional aid always improves their situation as compared to a
situation of no assistance at all. Moreover, the IFI also increases its utility level
moving from B to C. Since the IFI is assumed to be benevolent, this means that
overall welfare is increased.
All in all, conditioning aid on the policy parameter ω should improve the chances to
reduce growth inhibiting government policies and to enhance the efficiency of aid
with respect to the welfare of the poor. It will be quickly noted, however, that the
model misses out on one particularly important aspect, which is the reliability of the
governments commitment. Once the IFI has delivered its financial assistance, the
government has no more incentive to remain at point C since, at given T1, it can reach
a higher level of utility if it chooses ω in accordance with its reaction function RR.
This problem has been identified as a problem of time inconsistency (Sachs 1989,
Diwan and Rodrik 1992) since the governments preferences for the level of
distortions are different before and after the disbursement of aid.4
Others evoke the problem of lacking ownership, which essentially means the same
thing: Saying that a government does not own a particular policy is equivalent to
saying that it has no incentive to implement this policy. It may have had an incentive
to commit itself to that policy beforehand in order to obtain assistance, but as long as
the IFI has no means to enforce the commitments made, the government will continue
with the policy that is in its own best interest given the amount of aid it has received.
So defined, the lack of policy ownership can be expressed as the horizontal distance
between point C and the governments reaction function.5 To mitigate some of these
problems, the IFIs have recently introduced process conditionality (Booth 2001,
p. 3). In the next section we shall analyze the consequences of this change in terms of
our model.
                                                          
4 The authors quoted actually consider conditionality as a device to mitigate problems
of time inconsistency. This would be true if there was an effective enforcement
mechanism so that compliance could be ensured. In reality, the enforcement
mechanism is lacking, and the lack of compliance, even to formally agreed
conditions, and even when aid is delivered in tranches, is frequently observed (see e.g.
Hermes and Lesink 2001, Morrissey 2001; White and Morrissey 1997).
5 For an interesting general discussion of the difficulties to reconcile conditionality
and ownership, see Drazen (2001). Note, however, that Drazens definition of
ownership is not fully identical with the one used here.
82.3. Introducing process conditionality
While traditional conditionality focuses on outcomes, process conditionality focuses
on processes” (Foster at al. 1999) or actions” (Dixit 2000). We shall argue that the
idea of process conditionality is to give more influence to those groups in the
developing country who directly benefit from pro-poor grow. Since the IFI is assumed
to be well informed, it does not only know what policy measures improve the
situation of the poor (i.e. reducing distortions ω), but can also identify those groups
who benefit from these measures. Once the relevant groups are identified, the IFI may
ask the recipient government to include their representatives into the participatory
process.
The empowerment of some selected groups will change the political equilibrium in
the recipient country. In terms of our model where only two groups are considered,
this would imply an increase of the weight of the poor (θ) in the governments utility
function. Given that the poor have more political weight, the government will
consider more favorably any policy that increases their welfare. This means that, at a
given level of development assistance, it will now be willing to accept a lower level of
distortions.
More formally, modeling process conditionality as an increase in θ, we can say that
the recipient government now faces a new decision problem. It can either refuse the
empowerment of the poor in which case it receives no development assistance and
ends up at point A. Or it can accept the increase in θ required by the IFI and then
decide upon its optimal policy choice with respect to ω given the IFIs reaction
function T(ω) (or given some predefined T if the IFI fully gives up traditional
conditionally).
We know that with the initial weights θ and (1θ) and without aid, the government
can reach the utility level depicted by the indifference curve G1. Since the point A on
this curve will always remain among its options, it will not accept to launch a
participatory process empowering the poor if its resulting level of utility is not at least
as high. Since any change in θ implies a change in the shape of the governments
utility function, we need to examine whether the new θ (say θ) will allow the IFI to
fulfill the governments participation condition without reducing welfare for the IFI
itself.
Let us first consider what the new indifference curves of the recipient government
look like for higher θ. From (12) we know that
(13) ( )   W W
θ
θ-1                           0
d
dT PR
ωω −=⇔=
ω
This equality characterizes the locus of all points where the slope of the indifference
curves is just zero. Since both RWω  and 
PWω  are decreasing in W, an increase in θ
leads to an equality of both sides of the equation at lower levels of ω (see Figure 3).
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ω(θ) ω(θ)←
0 < θ < θ<1( ) R W
θ
θ-1
ω
( ) R W
θ
θ-1
ω
( ) R W
'θ
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ω
( ) R W
'θ
'θ-1
ω
PWω−
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This means that for any given utility level and for any given T, the locus where the
governments indifference curves have a zero slope shifts to the left if θ is increased.
This implies that the governments new reaction function (RR) lies to the left of the
initial reaction function (RR) once it has accepted the empowerment of the poor.
We also have some information about the slope of RR. Increasing θ rises the weight
of PTWω  in the numerator of equation (9). This implies that for rising θ, RR becomes
steeper in the T-ω-diagram and eventually turns negative.
Finally, we can calculate the effect of increasing θ on the slope of the governments
indifference curves. Computing the first derivative of (12) with respect to θ yields:
(14) ( ) ( )( )[ ] 2PTRT
P
T
RR
T
P
 bθW Wθ1
WbWWbW
dθ
ddT
−+−
−−−
=
ω ωω .
Since the denominator is unambiguously positive, the sign of the expression depends
on the numerator alone. The overall expression is positive as long as b is sufficiently
small. If aid is delivered as a grant (b=0), it is always positive. Since condition (6)
provides an upper bound for b, the possibilities for (14) to become negative are
further restrained. For instance, it can be shown that for an equal marginal effect of
aid on the welfare of the poor and the rich ( )PTRT WW =  the overall expression cannot
become negative as long as condition (6) is fulfilled. Therefore, we can say that in
general, expression (14) is positive. This implies that the new indifference curve G1
is steeper than the initial indifference curve G1 where the latter is positively sloped,
and flatter where it is negatively sloped.
The above described situation is illustrated in Figure 4. With G1 the government
reaches the same level of utility than without aid so that it just participates in the new
regime. The IFI maximizes its utility given the new indifference curve of the
government after the empowerment of the poor has taken place. As before it informs
10
the government about its reaction function T(ω) and the government determines ω
correspondingly.
Figure 4: Aid and distortion with both process and traditional conditionality
I0
I1 B
A
RR
ω
T
C
T2
ω2
G1
RR
G1
D
Initial lack of
ownership
lack of ownership
under θI2
T1
ω1
E
The new equilibrium is reached at D, at a higher level of utility for the IFI and, by
construction, the same level of utility for the recipient government. Since the IFIs
indifference curve I2 lies to the left of its initial indifference curve I1, we may say that
even traditional conditionality has increased. As long as the IFI continues to believe in
the effectiveness of traditional conditionality this is necessarily the case since
otherwise, the IFI itself would have no incentive to suggest the new regime. Despite
this stronger conditionality, the ownership problem may be mitigated. Due to the shift
of the RR-function to the left, the horizontal distance between this curve and the new
equilibrium point D may be smaller than before. This means that the policy
requirement of the IFI is less inconsistent with the governments own policy priorities
once all transfers have been made.
The positive effect of process conditionality comes out even more clearly if we
consider that in fact, given the problem of implementation of the agreed policies by
the recipient government, the IFI should actually compare the level of utility it can
reach with I0 rather than with I1. Moreover, since the incentive problem for the
recipient government persists as long as traditional conditionality is used, the policy
of the IFI described above has high chances to lead to point E, even if agreement has
been reached for D.
As long as the IFI has no power to enforce the implementation of agreed policies once
development assistance has been disbursed, there is no reason to believe in
compliance with agreed policies. Therefore, traditional conditionality will be of no
use. It could be dropped and be completely replaced by process conditionality. In fact,
the latter could be formulated in a way to reach exactly the level of distortions
targeted through traditional conditionality in the first place (ω1). In this case, political
influence of the poor must rise so much that, given T, it is in the governments own
interest to reduce distortions to ω1. The lack of ownership is reduced to zero. This
case is depicted in Figure 5.
11
Figure 5: Aid and distortion with process conditionality alone
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It should be noted that once process conditionality assures a negative slope of the RR-
curve, any increase in aid will always be beneficial for the poor. As opposed to the
initial situation, more aid will then lead to reduced distortions so that the poor benefit
from both, the direct increase in assistance and the policy change associated with it.
The above discussion has shown that process conditionality is an interesting tool to
deal with the problems of the political economy in the recipient country. Empowering
the poor increases their weight in the recipient governments utility function thereby
inducing the latter to implement policy reforms by reducing distortions and promoting
pro-poor growth. As long as the IFI has no means to enforce policy agreements that
are not owned by the government, process conditionality actually appears to be the
only viable instrument to push the desired reforms to the benefit of the poor.
3. BUREAUCRATIC INTEREST AND PUBLIC PRESSURE
We have derived the above results under the assumption that problems of political
economy arise only in the recipient country. It does not seem very plausible, however,
to assume that only recipient governments are subject to various interests while
donors are fully benevolent. In this section, we therefore introduce some aspects of
the political economy on the donor side. The IFI is no longer representing the interest
of the world as a whole. Its utility function is biased by bureaucratic interest and
public pressure.
In a first step, we shall consider that bureaucrats within the IFI tend to have a
preference for high aid disbursements since this is regarded as a sign of their own
relevance and power. This objective is frequently reported by observers of the aid
business (e.g. Easterly 2002, Mosley 1996, Vaubel 1991). In a second step, we shall
analyze the influence of special preferences of NGOs and bilateral donor governments
for one or the other interest group within the recipient country.
3.1. The IFI as a budget maximizer
The power of any bureaucratic institution is highly dependent on the budget at its
disposal. At the same time, in order to justify this budget and to be able to argue for
even more funds, the available resources have to be fully disbursed. If they are not,
12
they may be reduced in the future with negative consequences for the institutions
reputation, its influence and even the number of its staff.
For this reason, it is plausible to assume that when determining the optimal amount of
aid, the IFI will not merely consider the interests of the population in the recipient
country and of bilateral donor governments. Rather, the amount of aid disbursed will
enter directly into the IFIs utility function. Therefore, we add     which reflects the
IFIs interest in disbursing aid per se, with    as the relative weight in the IFIs utility
function.6
We may therefore rewrite equation (5) as:
(15) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) TρbT 1T,WT,WT,W U DRPI +γ−+ω+ω+ωγ=
The slope of the IFIs indifference curve is now given by:
(16) ( )( ) ( ) ρb 1WWW 
WWW 
d
dT
D
T
R
T
P
T
DRP
+γ−+++γ
++γ
−=
ω
ωωω
This corresponds to equation (10) for ρ=0. To see how introducing a positive value
for ρ, i.e. taking into account the bureaucratic preference for the disbursement of
development funds, is reflected in the results of our model, we compute the first
derivative of (16) with respect to ρ:
(17) ( )( ) ( )[ ] 2DTRTPT
DRP
 ρb 1WWW
WWW
dρ
ddT
+γ−+++γ
++γ
=
ω ωωω
Since the denominator is always positive, the sign of the overall expression depends
on the numerator, which is positive for small and negative for large ω. For small T,
this implies that the IFIs indifference curve becomes flatter, both in the area where it
is negatively and in the area where it is positively sloped. Further to the right, the
slope remains positive up to a higher T and ω than before. Since the governments
reaction function remains unchanged, the new equilibrium is reached at a higher level
of aid.
While this result is little surprising given that the IFI and the recipient government
now share the objective of increasing aid, it is interesting to see the implications of
this result for the different political actors. In this context, we need again to
distinguish between a situation with and without process conditionality. The two cases
are illustrated separately in Figures 6 and 7. In Figure 7, we assume that process
conditionality is strong enough to ensure that the governments reaction function is
negatively sloped.
                                                          
6 This simple extension of the basic model challenges the argument that disbursing aid
should be delegated to IFIs to achieve credibility for the donor governments
(Svensson 2000b). With an IFI that has an interest in maximizing budgets delegation
has just the opposite effect.
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ρ
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Figure 6: The IFI as a budget maximizer, without process conditionality
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Figure 7: The IFI as a budget maximizer, with process conditionality
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Clearly, in both cases, the recipient government reaches a higher level of utility than
before since its own objectives with respect to the amount of aid coincide to a large
extent with those of the IFI. As long as the poor are only weakly represented in the
governments utility function, it cannot be excluded, however, that all benefits arise
for the rich while the poor are worse off than before. This is because increasing aid
goes hand in hand with increasing distortions, as we have shown above.
Process conditionality can ensure that the benefits of the recipient government do not
arise to the detriment of the poor. As the weight of the poor increases in the
governments utility function, its reaction function turns to the left and becomes
negatively sloped. Increasing aid then goes hand in hand with decreasing distortions.
Any increase in aid therefore becomes unambiguously beneficial for the poor.
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The effect on the rich is clearly positive in the case without process conditionality,
and may remain positive in the case with process conditionality  despite reduced
distortions. The only clear losers of the budget maximizing behavior of the IFI will be
the donor governments. At any given volume of development assistance, their losses
in utility will be highest without process conditionality, since their disutility of
increasing aid will then be exacerbated by higher levels of distortion.
However, as illustrated in Figure 7, in the case of process conditionality, it may well
happen that the IFIs and the recipient governments indifference curves become so
similar that no tangential point can be reached for any finite amount of aid. Donors
therefore need to closely monitor the IFIs spending behavior and to define a budget
constraint determining the maximum amount of aid the IFI can disburse.
We conclude that given the political economy of the recipient country and the
typically high weight of the rich in the recipient governments initial utility function,
the IFIs bureaucratic budget maximization behavior runs the risk to be detrimental
not only for donor governments but also for the poor. The only unambiguous
beneficiaries in the developing country will be the rich. The empowerment of the poor
can change this situation, mitigate the donors disutility for any given volume of aid,
and ensure the benefits of the poor. Taking into account bureaucratic budget
maximization therefore strengthens the case for process conditionality.
3.2. The IFI under external pressure
So far, we have assumed that the IFI knows who best represents the interests of the
poor and uses process conditionality in order to increase their weight in the recipient
governments utility function. In reality, however, the situation in developing
countries is complex, and the best representatives of the poor might not always be
easy to identify. There are often numerous groups claiming this role.
Even within the donor community, there is generally no unanimity with respect to
which groups should or should not be empowered. International NGOs have often
complained that local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)  often their own local
partners  have not sufficiently been integrated into the discussions (see e.g. Marshall
and Woodroffe 2001, pp. 10f.). Complaints by local groups whose intention to
participate was declined, are taken up by various interest groups in the donor
countries as well as by external researchers. Even in the case of Uganda which is
frequently cited as one of the most successful countries with respect to the
implementation of the PRS-process, numerous groups are dissatisfied with their
integration into the related discussions (Lister and Nyamugasira 2003, pp. 102f.).
Even if the IFI knows who really represents the poor, it will tend to take into
account the position of other relevant actors too. Permanent pressure from bilateral
donor institutions or international NGOs could deteriorate the IFI bureaucrats
working climate. Moreover, in the long run, dissatisfaction of bilateral donors may
also lead to reductions in the IFIs budget. The IFI therefore has a strong incentive to
integrate the positions of NGOs and bilateral donor governments, at least partly, into
its own policy stance in order to avoid too much criticism and external pressure.
15
One might also argue that the IFI itself is not always sure of who are the real
representatives of the poor. Alternatively, the IFI might be well able to find out the
right group to support, but this process might take more time than the IFI is willing to
invest. There is ample evidence on hurry-up lending (Vaubel 1991) and rushed aid
disbursements or debt forgiveness, most recently again in the context of PRS-
processes (Michaelowa 2003, p. 472; Marshall and Woodroffe 2001, p. 10; Booth
2001, p. 18). In all these cases, orienting the IFIs policy at the bilateral donors
position will at least provide it with some immunity against later criticism.7
Therefore, if the utility function of bilateral donors is characterized by a specific
valuation of the different interest groups within the recipient country, the IFI will not
only consider direct welfare in the donor country, but integrate the donors utility
function into its own.
More formally, returning to our model with only two interest groups in the recipient
country, we may rewrite the donors utility function (4) as:
(18) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 10 ,1φ0                 , T,W1T,W φT,WU RPDD ≤λ≤≤≤ωλ−+ωλ+ω=
The change from (4) to (18) implies that the donors utility now depends on welfare in
the recipient country in a different way than assumed earlier. While initially, cross-
national interdependence was modeled only through the international spill-over
effects of the recipient countrys policy ω (e.g. trade effects or effects on the financial
markets), the donors now derive a direct utility from the welfare of the two groups in
the developing country (altruistic preferences). The parameter ϕ  is defined in a way
to reflect the assumption that altruistic preferences do not dominate the preferences
for the donors own direct welfare. The weights λ and (1λ) reveal the strength of
donors preferences for the poor and the rich respectively. Since NGOs are not
included separately in the model, they are assumed to exert their influence via the
donor governments. NGO pressure on donor governments to put more emphasis on
the well being of the poor would thus be reflected in a higher λ. If, however, business
interests are more interested in the well being of the rich, and can influence the donor
governments accordingly, (1λ) should increase. As a short cut, we assume that the
donors utility function reflects the result of the entire aid related politico-economic
process within donor countries.
If the IFI takes the donors interests into account, its objective function becomes:
(19) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) TρbT 1T,WT,W1 φT,WφU DRPI +γ−+ω+ωλ−+γ+ωλ+γ=
and the slope of the IFIs indifference curve becomes:
(20) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )  ρb 1WW1φWφ
WW1 φWφ
d
dT
D
T
R
T
P
T
DRP
+γ−++λ−+γ+λ+γ
+λ−+γ+λ+γ
−=
ω
ωωω
                                                          
7 Note that this pressure has probably increased in recent years, where several
commissions have been active to investigate the role and function of IFIs. Since most
tend to be quite critical about the IFIs, they have any incentive to try to please donor
governments by taking their positions more strongly into consideration.
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For λ = 0.5, i.e. equal weights for the poor and the rich in the donors utility function,
this expression comes very close to equation (16). However, the introduction of
altruistic preferences into the donor governments objectives leads to a generally
higher weight of welfare in the recipient country. This implies, in particular, that the
denominator turns negative only for T larger than before, so that the backward
bending of the IFIs indifference curve will occur only for relatively large T.
What is really interesting here, however, is the case where donors do not attribute
equal weights to both groups. We can consider the effect of rising λ, i.e. of increasing
the weight of the poor in the considerations of the donor country, by computing the
first derivative of (20) with respect to λ:
(21)
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )[ ]
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Since the denominator as well as the first term of the numerator are always positive,
the sign of the overall expression only depends on the second and third term of the
numerator. The second  term becomes  negative for ( ) ρ+γ−> b 1WDT . Given the
concavity assumption for DW , this tends to happen predominantly for large T. The
third term becomes negative for RT
P
T WW > , i.e. if at a given level of distortions, an
increase in development assistance is more beneficial for the poor than for the rich.
For the shape of the IFIs indifference curves this result has the following
implications: As long as the overall expression remains positive, the IFIs indifference
curves become steeper (in the predominant area where they are positively sloped).
This is not surprising since the higher weight of the welfare of the poor leads to the
necessity to compensate them with higher amounts of aid for any increase in
distortions. Only when the donors direct welfare becomes too seriously reduced by
higher aid this situation will change. This tends to happen only for relatively high T
where the initial indifference curves are negatively sloped so that, here again, the
slope of the new curves tends to be steeper. Finally, a large positive effect of aid on
the welfare of the poor will dampen the impact of rising their weight in the IFIs
utility function since in this case, small increases in aid are sufficient to make up for
higher distortions.
All in all, and especially if the latter effect is not too strong, the equilibrium with
higher weights of the poor will be reached at even higher levels of aid, at least as long
as the IFIs budget constraint is not binding. Increasing λ is always beneficial for the
poor. Their welfare can be increased even further if the IFI makes use of process
conditionality to move the relative weights of the two groups in the recipient
governments utility function closer towards its own preferences or those of the donor
governments.
Unfortunately, the above discussion suggests that the politico-economic process on
the donor side may not always result in an increased but also in a reduced weight of
the poor. For any decrease in λ, we face a situation where the IFIs indifference curve
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tends to be strongly negatively sloped for small ω, and flatter thereafter where the
slope is positive. If business interests are in favor of putting a larger weight on the
welfare of the higher income classes, than altruism can actually have negative
effects on the welfare of the poor.
The most extreme case would be λ = 0. In this case, equation (20) can be rewritten as:
(22) ( )( ) ( )   b 1WWφW
W WφW
d
dT
D
T
R
T
P
T
DRP
ρ+γ−+++γ+γ
++γ+γ
−=
ω
ωωω
Note that the poor are not fully left out of consideration since we assumed that the
donors positions influence the IFIs utility, but do not fully substitute for the IFIs
own initial valuations. Nevertheless, the strong weight of the rich in the IFIs revised
utility function implies that the numerator turns negative only for relatively higher
values of ω. In fact, it may even happen that the IFI now reaches a higher level of
utility for both higher T and higher ω.
Of course, in this situation, the IFI has no incentive to use process conditionality to
increase θ, the weight of the poor in the recipient governments utility function. This
situation is illustrated in Figure 8. Ignoring who really represents the poor or
opportunistically listening to donor governments and the vested interests they
represent, the IFI may even support the rich conditioning aid on lower θ. In this case,
the situation would become even worse.
Figure 8: Aid and distortion when donor interest groups lobby for the rich
RR
ω
T
T4
ω5
Tmax: IFIs budget constraint
I5
H
As can be observed, the political equilibrium will be obtained at point H, implying the
highest level of development assistance consistent with the IFIs budget constraint.
Moreover, the level of distortions reached (ω5) is the highest of all cases analyzed so
far.
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A last case to consider is that the donors are themselves influenced by the position of
the recipient government. Given the difficulties to assess the political situation in any
far away developing country, political actors in donor countries, including both aid
agencies and NGOs, often argue that the weights can be determined correctly only
within the recipient country itself. Unfortunately, it is most likely that developing
country governments have any incentive to present their preferences for the poor and
the rich, θ and (1θ), as the true values and that precisely these weights are reported
to the donor agents as reflecting the situation in the recipient country adequately and
unbiased. There is a high probability that in this case the equilibrium levels of aid and
distortion will be similar to those depicted in Figure 8. In any case, the IFIs and the
recipient governments indifference curves will then look relatively similar, and there
will not be much scope for any process conditionality to the benefit of the poor.
Overall, this section has shown that taking into account the political economy on the
donor side can reverse the optimistic picture drawn in the previous sections. Process
conditionality appears to be a very interesting and useful tool to enhance pro-poor
growth and to rise the welfare of the poor as long as the IFI holds all necessary
information to assess the political situation in the recipient country and to select the
true representatives of the poor. If it does not hold this information or if other
bureaucratic interests reduce its incentive to obtain and / or make use of this
information, process conditionality loses its effectiveness in achieving its desired
goal. While the instrument as such appears to be really innovative, it will become
useful only once the more fundamental problems of the aid business have been
solved.
4. CONCLUSIONS
It is well known that within recipient countries of official aid, governments
preferences are often biased towards the interests of the rich who tend to have a
higher political influence through economic, financial or military means, through their
proximity to government officials, or through their capacity to influence public
opinion. Therefore, it is not at all clear that more aid will actually reach the poor.
In such a situation, conditioning aid on the participation of the poor in the political
decision making process can indeed be very effective. Participation leads to
empowerment, and even more so, if it is supplemented by other measures of capacity
building. The poor thereby obtain a political voice which in turn leads to a change in
the weight attributed to their welfare in the utility function of their respective
governments. As a consequence, developing country governments will adopt policies
more in line with pro-poor growth. Since this policy shift will be based on their own
changed preferences, the ownership problem arising in the context of traditional
conditionality can be avoided. Process conditionality therefore appears to be clearly
beneficial for the poor.
This result, however, holds only as long as IFIs and bilateral donors are assumed to be
well informed and benevolent. The situation may be different if they are not. In a first
step, the IFI can be considered as a bureaucracy interested in the amount of
development assistance disbursed, rather than in the efficiency and effectiveness of
aid. This will generally lead to high aid and strong policy distortions to the detriment
of the poor. However, this situation further increases the relevance and effectiveness
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of process conditionality. With process conditionality, IFI aid expenditure will remain
high, but at least, it can be ensured that this will encourage policies enhancing pro-
poor growth.
If, however, in a second step, public pressure on bilateral donor governments and the
IFIs is also taken into account, the picture suddenly changes. Public pressure by
NGOs and other interested parties, which seems to have been growing over recent
years, is beneficial for the poor only if the poor are really at target. However, not only
good intentions are behind public pressure. Business interests, for instance, might
lead to different priorities when it comes to the empowerment of a particular group in
a developing country. Within donor countries, NGOs and other interest groups have
the incentive to try to promote their own partner organizations pretending that these
are the real representatives of the poor.
In fact, intentions do not even need to be bad. It suffices that there is uncertainty
about the true socio-economic and political situation in the recipient country, and that
there are different local interest groups claiming to represent the poor. In reality, it is
often difficult to determine who really represents the poor. It may well happen that
those already having much voice within their country will also be listened to most in
donor countries. Aware of their own informational deficit, donor aid agencies and
NGOs may also directly recur to the advise of recipient country officials in order to
find out which local groups should be promoted. In both cases, the resulting priorities
will reflect rather closely the already prevailing balance of power in the developing
country. The IFIs now adopt  at least partly  the donor countries position. After all,
this is an easy way to avoid both, later criticism and the cost of more detailed
information through their own staff. Therefore, the IFIs own policy preferences move
closer to those of the recipient, and there will not be much scope for any process
conditionality to the benefit of the poor. In extreme cases, process conditionality can
even become counterproductive.
Overall, it can be concluded that the effectiveness of process conditionality crucially
depends on the selection of the true representatives of the poor. For the IFIs, this
requires substantial information about the socio-economic and political conditions in
the recipient country, and the willingness to defend their position against external
pressure. It appears that currently, IFIs do not fulfil either of these conditions. In
particular, rushed lending or rushed debt forgiveness destroy all chances of a
meaningful participatory process. Moreover, increasing international criticism seems
to have made the IFIs even more responsive to the pressure of bilateral donors.
Democratic accountability of the IFIs, while in itself a relevant objective, can backfire
in a situation where uncertainty is as high as in the relationship between aid and pro-
poor growth.
20
REFERENCES
Alesina, Alberto and David Dollar (2000): Who Gives Aid to Whom and Why?,
Journal of Economic Growth 5, 33-64.
Azam, Jean-Paul and Jean-Jacques Laffont (2003): Contracting for Aid, in: Journal of
Development Economics Vol. 70, pp. 25-58
Booth, David (2001): PRSP Processes in 8 African Countries - Initial Impacts and
Potential for Institutionalisation, paper presented at the WIDER Conference on
Debt Relief, 17-18 August, Helsinki
Boone, Peter (1996) Politics and the Effectiveness of Aid, European Economic
Review Vol. 40, pp. 289-329.
Boughton, James and Alex Mourmouras (2002): Is Policy Ownership an Operational
Concept, IMF Working Paper 02/72.
Burnside, Craig and David Dollar (2000): Aid, Policies and Growth, American
Economic Review Vol. 90, pp. 847-868.
Diwan, Ishac and Dani Rodrik (1992): External Debt, Adjustment and Burden
Sharing: a Unified Framework, Princeton Studies in International Finance
No. 73, Princeton
Dixit, Avinash (2000) IMF Programs as Incentive Mechanisms, mimeo, Princeton
University.
Drazen, Allan (2001): Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political
Economy Approach, Paper prepared for the Second Annual IMF Research
Conference, 29-30 November, Washington, D.C.
Drazen, Allan (2000): Political Economy in Macroeconomics, Princeton (Princeton
University Press)
Easterly, William (2002): The Cartel of Good Intentions: Bureaucracy versus markets
in foreign aid, Working Paper No. 4, Center for Global Development, Institute
for International Economics, Washington (revised version, May)
Foster, Mick, John Healey, Matthew Martin and Howard White (1999): Linking
HIPC II Debt Relief with Poverty Reduction and Wider Aid Issues: Some
Reflections and Suggestions, paper for DFID, London
Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001): Special Interest Politics, Cambridge
(MIT-Press).
Hermes, Niels and Robert Lensink (2001): Changing Conditions for Development
Aid: A New Paradigm?, in: Journal of Development Studies Vol. 37, No. 6,
pp. 1-16
Lahiri, Sajal and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller (2000): Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and
Aid Allocation, in: Economic Journal Vol. 110, pp. 62-79
Lister, Sarah and Warren Nyamugasira (2003): Design Contradictions in the New
Architecture of Aid? Reflections from Uganda on the Roles of Civil Society
Organisations, in: Development Policy Review Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 93-106
21
Marshall, Alison and Jessica Woodroffe (2001): Policies to Roll-back the State and
Privatize? Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers investigated, a debt policy report
by the World Development Movement paper presented at the WIDER
Conference on Debt Relief, 17-18 August, Helsinki
Martens, Bertin, Uwe Mummert, Peter Murrell and Paul Seabright (2002): The
Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid, Cambridge (Cambridge University
Press)
Mayer, Wolfgang and Alex Mourmouras (2002) Vested Interests in a Positive Theory
of IFI Conditionality, IMF Working Paper 02/73.
Michaelowa, Katharina (2003): The Political Economy of the Enhanced HIPC-
Initiative, in: Public Choice Vol. 114, No. 3-4, pp. 461-476
Morrissey, Oliver (2001): Pro-Poor Conditionality for Aid and Debt Relief in East
Africa, paper presented at the WIDER Conference on Debt Relief, 17-18
August, Helsinki
Mosley, Paul (1996): The Failure of Aid and Adjustment Policies in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Counter-Examples and Policy Proposals, in: Journal of African
Economies, Vol. 5, pp. 406-443.
Rodrik, Dani (1995) Political Economy of Trade Policy, in G. Grossman and K.
Rogoff (eds): Handbook of International Economics 3, Amsterdam (Elsevier),
pp. 1457-1494.
Sachs, Jeffrey (1989): Conditionality, Debt Relief and Developing Country Debt
Crisis, in J. Sachs (ed.): Developing Country Debt and Economic
Performance, Vol. 1: International Financial System, Chicago (University of
Chicago Press)
Svensson, Jakob (2000a) Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking, Journal of International
Economics 51, pp. 437-461.
Svensson, Jakob (2000b) When Is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid Dependence and
Conditionality, Journal of Development Economics 61, pp. 61-84.
Vaubel, Roland (1991): The Political Economy of the International Monetary Fund: A
Public Choice Analysis, in: Vaubel, Roland and Thomas Willet (eds): The
Political Economy of International Organizations, Boulder (Westview Press),
pp. 204-244
White, Howard and Oliver Morrissey (1997): Conditionality when Donor and
Recipient Preferences Vary, in: Journal of International Development Vol. 9,
No. 4, pp. 497-505
Willett, Thomas D. (2000) A Soft-Core Public Choice Analysis of the International
Monetary Fund, Claremont Colleges Working Paper.
World Bank (1998): Assessing Aid, Washington, D.C.
